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Abstract
Phenomenologists have given considerable attention to questions of human embodiment and 
the experience of being enmeshed within the immanent world, most notably in the thought 
of Merleau-Ponty. This focus on incarnation has, in turn, heavily influenced contemporary 
philosophy of religion and post-theological turn phenomenology. Yet when speaking of 
the human experience of embodiment, philosophers run the risk of adopting a normative 
perspective that universalizes a particular type of human body while excluding or margin-
alizing different forms as deviant, defective, or deficient. This paper considers numerous 
critiques against the perceived normativity in Merleau-Ponty’s account of embodiment in 
the Phenomenology of Perception (feminist, gender studies, post-colonial critiques) before 
positing disability studies as an even more radical – and privileged – means to dispense 
with phenomenological normativity. In doing so, this paper attempts to open a space for 
multiple phenomenological perspectives for experiencing the world as a body, yet without 
lapsing into an entirely relativistic individualism that precludes phenomenology from 
making meaningful claims about the experience of human embodiment as such.
Keywords: Merleau-Ponty, Gayle Salamon, Disability Studies, normativity, defective embod-
iment, handicap, pluralistic perspectives, incarnation
Although Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s account of embodiment provides a valuable means of reframing human subjectivity and leads us to a 
more authentic understanding of our being-in-the-world, his account none-
theless proves problematic by assuming a normative phenomenological 
perspective. Despite being freed from the seemingly inescapable dilemma 
between either mechanistic determinacy or transcendental psychologism, 
the embodied subjectivity he articulates adopts a very particular, limited 
perspective according to a masculine, heterosexual, white and able-bodied 
being-in-the-world. Notwithstanding the valuable insights and contribu-
tions of Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy and its emphasis on embodied human 
subjectivity, his account fails to recognize the reality of non-normative 
embodiment and consequently requires emendation and expansion. 
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Contemporary critiques note that the perspective adopted by Merleau-
Ponty in the Phenomenology of Perception advocates (perhaps unintentionally) 
a “normative” account of embodiment that ignores disparate experiences of 
the body along the lines of race, sexuality, gender, and physical infirmity. 
In using the terms of “normalcy” and “normativity,” I intend to criticize the 
underlying assumption that embodiment exists as an overarching, singular 
category of incarnate existence in which a normal, healthy, or “perfect” 
form is implicitly understood, and against which all other embodiments 
are subsequently measured. Such a model leaves no room for variability 
in the types or modes of embodiment – rather, it establishes a spectrum 
ranging from “normal” and “healthy” embodiment to the somehow deviant, 
defective, or deficient.
I contend that Merleau-Ponty’s account of embodiment can benefit 
from expansive and supplementary critiques provided by the perspec-
tives of non-normative modes of embodiment – especially those of racial 
differences, feminist perspectives, and gender/sexuality studies. Yet 
beyond the very necessary and fruitful critiques provided through these 
perspectives, I see in disability studies a privileged mode of upending 
normative embodiment at an even more fundamental level. I shall con-
sider Merleau-Ponty’s notion of embodiment before considering the var-
ious critiques and interventions staged by non-normative perspectives. 
Ultimately, I wager that through the vantage point of disabled persons 
we stand to gain the possibility for multiple phenomenological categories 
of embodiment, free from the constraints and limitations of a singular, 
normative perspective. 
I. The Embodied Self:  
Merleau-Ponty on Incarnation and the Body Schema
Before embarking on a presentation and assessment of critiques pre-
sented against Merleau-Ponty’s normative account of embodiment, let us 
review (albeit briefly) the central contributions of his account of embodied 
subjectivity – especially those of the Body Schema, of embodiment as a felt 
sense of capacities and powers, and the reframing of intentionality that his 
account implies. 
Merleau-Ponty upends the dualistic notions of the human subject that 
predominate the history of philosophy, rejecting both mechanistic deter-
minacy and psychological transcendentalism. Furthermore, he posits the 
human subject as a body fully enmeshed within the world – an embodied 
subjectivity who arises as the body passes through the world in its specific 
context, relations, and situations. The Phenomenology of Perception offers us 
a new way of conceiving the body, grounded in a “radical proposition that 
attention to the felt sense of the body need not require the assertion of a 
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body that stands behind, or exists prior to, our perception.”1 For Merleau-
Ponty, there is no pre-embodied or super-embodied “subjectivity,” for the 
felt sense of the body is primary:
I am not in front of my body, I am in my body, or rather I am my body…I 
do not simply contemplate the relations between the segments of my 
body and the correlations between my visual body and my tactile body; 
rather, I am myself the one who holds these arms and these legs together, 
the one who simultaneously sees and touches them.2
Human subjectivity arises in the lived experience of the body itself, it 
does not transcend or precede embodiment “from without,” but rather it 
understands, perceives, and experiences itself.
“If one can still speak of an interpretation in the perception of one’s own 
body, then it would be necessary to say that it interprets itself,” Merleau-
Ponty claims, once again asserting the primacy and priority of embodied 
being in discussions of human subjectivity.
Yet despite his emphasis on incarnate, embodied being, materiality 
alone cannot provide an adequate means of understanding this embod-
iment. The body cannot be contained purely by its physical boundaries, 
nor is it understood as a collection of disparate parts synthesized by a 
pre-existing subject. He consequently articulates a felt sense of embodi-
ment in an expressive space, enmeshed in the world, through the lens of 
the body’s felt capacities and powers. Merleau-Ponty articulates this as 
the body schema, “not merely an experience of my body, but rather an 
experience of my body in the world,” one which is characterized by its 
possibilities and capacities as acting, expressing, and engaged through 
motor intentionality.3 This body is, itself, the “very movement of expres-
sion,” and is “eminently an expressive space.”4 The original intentionality 
of the embodied subject arises then according to this notion of a body in 
the world with reference to its capacities for engagement and expression 
in that world. Consequently, we no longer posit a “thinking subject” 
before or above the embodied, living subject. Rather, our consciousness 
feels itself primarily and originarily according to its capacities (or, as 
Merleau-Ponty describes, “consciousness is originarily not an ‘I think that,’ 
but rather an ‘I can’”).5 Human subjectivity thus emerges as an embodied 
being-in-the-world that apprehends itself through its living and acting in 
its particular situation. 
1  Gayle Salamon, Assuming a Body: Transgender and the Rhetorics of Materiality (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2010), 4. 
2  Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, trans. Donald A. Landes (New 
York: Routledge, 2012), 151. Emphasis added.
3  Ibid., 142. 
4  Ibid., 147.
5  Ibid., 139.
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Yet this emphasis on embodiment through the lens of potentialities and 
capacity proves problematic on some levels, seemingly asserting a “nor-
mative” view of embodiment. This perspective disregards and suppresses 
other forms of non-normative embodiment for whom the body becomes 
a site of limitation rather than possibility. Most strikingly, and specifically 
with regard to disability and physical handicap, Merleau-Ponty’s writings 
are colored by an implicit assumption that disabled persons represent an 
inferior version of embodiment.6 In subsequent critical readings, any other 
alternative modes of embodiment take on a similarly deficient or defective 
character when measured against the norm assumed by his account of 
embodiment.
In the pages that follow, I highlight several critiques and problems posed 
by such normative embodiment, as well as offer an attempt at emendation 
and expansion of Merleau-Ponty’s thought. Rather than rejecting his phe-
nomenological project, I contend that by challenging normative embodi-
ment at its most fundamental level (the notion of an able-bodied individual 
defined by his or her capacities in the world), we stand to gain valuable 
insight into the possibility for various modes or types of embodiment with-
out recourse to a normative view. Thus, alternative modes of living embod-
iment differently emerge, allowing a space for phenomenological assessment 
of these kinds of embodiment on their own terms – not simply as patho-
logical, defective, or somehow deficient variants of a supposed normal.
II. Contemporary Critiques  
of Normative Embodiment  
in Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception
Critics abound to note the inadequacy of Merleau-Ponty’s account of 
embodiment – privileging (or exclusively adopting) the masculinist, patri-
archal perspective of a healthy, white, heterosexual male. Despite his par-
ticular insight with respect to the role of the body in offering a genuinely 
phenomenological account of human subjectivity, a striking dearth of 
engagement with different modes of embodiment along the lines of race, 
gender, sexuality, and disability persists throughout his work. Numerous 
non-normative embodied experiences find his account both insufficient 
6  See, for example, Phenomenology of Perception, 81, wherein Merleau-Ponty describes the 
loss of one’s vital connection to the world (or the loss of a world) using images of disability. 
He notes that some patients can “lose their world as soon as the contents begin to slip away. 
They renounce their usual life even before it becomes impossible, they become crippled before 
literally being so, and they break their vital contact with the world before having lost sensory 
contact with it” (Emphasis added, 81-82). Merleau-Ponty’s reliance upon the pathological 
studies of the patient Schneider throughout the Phenomenology of Perception similarly raise 
concerns – seemingly deriving a view of the “normal” through negative definition against 
Schneider’s psychological impairments and observations of his pathology in a clinical setting. 
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and incongruent with their experience. Throughout the Phenomenology of 
Perception, Merleau-Ponty either willfully ignores or seemingly glosses over 
the possibility for different or alternative modes of embodiment – modes 
of embodiment which his account cannot articulate commensurately or in 
an adequate way.
In response, four valuable critiques arise through feminist perspectives, 
queer/transgender theory critiques, post-colonial racialized phenomenol-
ogy, and disability studies. I argue that while each of these provides valuable 
insights and potential emendations to Merleau-Ponty’s account, the vantage 
point of disability studies offers the most privileged and strongest means 
of dispensing with phenomenological notions of normative embodiment 
in a definitive way. Let us briefly consider the contributions and critiques 
of each before attempting to salvage and expand Merleau-Ponty’s phenom-
enology as open to the possibility for non-normative, alternative types of 
embodiment that need not be characterized as “defective” and “deficient,” 
measured as inferior and pathological subsets of an overarching (and fan-
tastical) norm.
Some of the most notable and valuable critiques of normative embod-
iment and the phenomenological perspectives it implies come from femi-
nism and gender studies. Feminist critiques of Merleau-Ponty, as well as 
readings put forward by gender studies and queer theory, share in a general 
rejection of Merleau-Ponty’s assumption of a normative, heterosexual male 
depiction of embodied living. Although they adopt variable assessments 
of his thought, they nonetheless expose the incongruity of his accounts for 
women as well as non-normative embodiments of gender and sexuality. 
Iris Marion Young stands out in this regard, noting the insufficiency 
of Merleau-Ponty’s account of the body schema and motor intentionality 
when characterized by its capacities and powers (engaging with the world 
through the perspective of an “I can”). Drawing from her examination of 
feminine body comportment and styles of motricity, Young argues that 
women – socialized in a sexist society – exhibit a sense of limitation, bur-
den, and general lack of capacity in both their bodily expressions and their 
self-perception. The notion of possibility in the “I can” that proves central 
to Merleau-Ponty’s account of the body schema and intentionality becomes 
limited and constrained for the female, oftentimes characterized by timidity, 
restrain, and a general reticence more so than possibilities, capacities, and 
powers. She notes that from a young age, girls are socially and culturally 
inculcated with a sense of timidity and physical limitation, a sense which 
in turn denies her the full range of possibilities and freedom characteristic 
of subjectivity. Such a reality renders the woman a “living contradiction” 
as both subject and object:
Woman is thereby both culturally and socially denied by the subjectiv-
ity, autonomy, and creativity which are definitive of being human and 
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which in patriarchal society are accorded the man…the female person 
who enacts the existence of women in patriarchal society must therefore 
live a contradiction: as human she is a free subject who participates in 
transcendence, but her situation as a woman denies her that subjectivity 
and transcendence.7
Young proceeds to argue that the particular modes or styles of feminine 
bodily motility, action, and “comportment” incarnate this sense of living 
contradiction in expressive form – she is thus a body that lives between 
subjectivity and objectivity, transcendence and immanence, and who 
never fully arrives at the sense of capacity and possibility characteristic 
of Merleau-Ponty’s account of the body schema and motor intentionality. 
In patriarchal culture, the sense of freedom, autonomy, and creativity 
of full subjectivity is defined in relation to the male and afforded to him 
primarily, subsequently available to the female mode of embodiment only 
partially and secondarily. 
Young proceeds to examine how female body movements incarnate 
this sense of burden and limitation, and that this in turn translates into 
self-experience, perception and understanding. She notes, “Women often 
do not perceive themselves as capable of lifting and carrying heavy things, 
pushing and shoving with significant force, pulling, squeezing, grasping, 
or twisting with force,” a reality ultimately undergirded by the sense that a 
woman “frequently does not trust the capacity of her body to engage itself 
in physical relation to things. Consequently, she often lives her body as a 
burden, which must be dragged and prodded along, and at the same time 
protected.”8 This expressive and incarnate reality of feminine comportment 
– female embodiment – does not match up commensurately with Merleau-
Ponty’s account of bodily intentionality and embodied being. His account 
presumes and articulates the stance of the male in a patriarchal cultural 
milieu, whereby he “locates intentionality in motility; the possibilities which 
are opened up in the world depend on the mode and limits of the bodily 
‘I can.’ Feminine existence, however, often does not enter bodily relation 
to possibilities by its own comportment toward its surroundings in an 
unambiguous and confident ‘I can.’”9 Merleau-Ponty’s normative phenom-
enological perspective consequently fails to give an accurate or applicable 
accounting of female embodiment. Perhaps unintentionally through igno-
rance or as a consequence of the necessarily first person singular nature that 
the phenomenological perspective employs as its initial point of departure, 
his account fails to note the discrepancy between male and female embod-
iment with respect to the powers and capacities of motor intentionality. 
7  Iris Marion Young, “Throwing Like a Girl,” in On Female Body Experience: “Throwing 
Like a Girl” and Other Essays (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 31-2.
8  Ibid., 33; 36. 
9  Ibid., 36.
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Young reads this as a major blind spot in Merleau-Ponty’s thought, an 
ignorance that renders female embodiment as somehow deficient or defec-
tive when measured against the “norm” of the capable male. She reads this 
in terms of physical disability and handicap – an incredibly charged rhe-
torical term, yet a useful distinction that we shall return to later. She notes:
Women in sexist society are physically handicapped. Insofar as we learn to 
live out our existence in accordance with the definition that patriarchal 
culture assigns to us, we are physically inhibited, confined, positioned, 
and objectified. As lived bodies we are not open and unambiguous tran-
scendences that move out to master a world that belongs to us, a world 
constituted by our own intentions and projections.10
The relationship that female embodiment has to the world emerges in 
stark contrast to that of the account put forward by Merleau-Ponty (see 
above, Section I). Young’s assessment portrays female embodiment in terms 
of limitation and burden – quite the opposite of Merleau-Ponty’s articula-
tion of the body schema and motor intentionality through the lens of pos-
sibility and power. Her account demonstrates an essential discontinuity, 
an insufficiency, and an incongruity between Merleau-Ponty’s account of 
embodiment (presumed “normative” or as an overarching perspective for 
all embodiment) and that of women in patriarchal society. 
Beyond the incongruity of the Merleau-Ponty’s normative (masculine) 
account with respect to female embodiment, his phenomenological lens 
proves normative to the exclusion of other modes of embodiment as well. 
In her now-famous 1989 essay, “Sexual Ideology and Phenomenological 
Description,” Judith Butler assesses certain normative aspects of Merleau-
Ponty’s phenomenology of embodiment, in particular his account of the 
body as a sexed being. Her criticism of the normative masculine account of 
sexuality and affectivity prove convincing and have far-reaching implica-
tions. Beyond his exclusive use of heterosexual examples, Merleau-Ponty’s 
account becomes most problematic when he grounds his account of sexu-
ality in the person of (the male) Schneider, articulating sexuality through 
the lens of masculine patterns of arousal and eroticization. 
Butler notes that while there appears an “openness” in Merleau-Ponty’s 
account of sexuality as a “modality of existence, the ‘place’ in which possi-
bilities are realized and dramatized” rather than a merely “static or univocal 
fact of existence,” such an openness is nonetheless deceptive.11 Even though 
he draws from the experience of a young girl suffering from aphonia and 
insomnia when her affective desires and expressions are disrupted by exter-
10  Ibid., 42-3. Emphasis added.
11  Judith Butler, “Sexual Ideology and Phenomenological Description: A Feminist Critique 
of Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception,” in The Thinking Muse: Feminism and Modern 
French Philosophy, eds. Jeffner Allen and Iris Marion Young (Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 1989), 86. 
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nal circumstances, Butler nonetheless reads Merleau-Ponty as decidedly 
masculinist in his approach to sexuality.12 She notes that his descriptions of 
sexuality, “turn out to contain tacit normative assumptions about the het-
erosexual character of sexuality,” a statement that proves true when consid-
ering his examples of the types of lovers or methods of arousal described.13 
Yet Butler presses further, noting that Merleau-Ponty not only assumes 
that sexual relations are heterosexual, but “that the masculine sexuality is 
characterized by a disembodied gaze that subsequently defines its object as 
mere body.”14 Indeed, Merleau-Ponty does seemingly assume a masculinist 
perspective as an objectifying viewer when, without even questioning the 
“objectifying” and depersonalized nature of his example, he demonstrates 
Schneider’s abnormality by claiming that he no longer achieves arousal 
when confronted with the “perception of a body” or “obscene pictures.”15 
For his part, however, Merleau-Ponty seems to assume that such a rela-
tionship between sexual patterns of arousal and an objectifying gaze is 
purely “normal” and “natural.” While Butler’s critiques prove helpful in 
unmasking certain presumptions that guide Merleau-Ponty’s assessment 
of sexuality in a decidedly masculinist, heterosexual manner, I nonetheless 
find that his account remains open to further exploration and expansion. 
Against Butler, however, I would side more with a reading put for-
ward by Gayle Salamon in her recent treatment of transgendered embodi-
ment, Assuming a Body: Transgender and Rhetorics of Materiality. For her part, 
Salamon adopts a more sympathetic and constructive reading of Merleau-
Ponty, mining his thought for potential resources and insights through 
which to articulate alternative modes of embodiment. She thus endeavors to 
expand his account of embodiment to include the non-normative – salvag-
ing his work for wider phenomenological appropriation and applicability. 
Salamon adopts a more sympathetic reading of Merleau-Ponty, and 
one which I find more commensurate with his writings on sexuality than 
Butler’s. While it is true, as Butler contends, that Merleau-Ponty adopts a 
decidedly masculine approach to sexuality (in particular) and embodiment 
12  See, for example, Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception 163-5. Merleau-Ponty 
draws from this example of a girl who subsequently develops aphonia and insomnia upon 
being banned by her mother from seeing her lover. He uses this example to demonstrate 
how the body expresses “total existence” in a way that does not separate the signification or 
meaning from its incarnate manifestation (as if the bodily expression were merely an external 
accompaniment to the reality being expressed), but rather that the state being expressed – 
the real existing state – “accomplishes itself in the body. This embodied sense is the central 
phenomenon of which body and mind, or sign and signification are abstract moments” (169). 
13  See Butler, 86.
14  Idem.
15  Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, 157. Butler similarly notes that the evidence 
given for such “sexual inertia” raises the question of what deeper “cultural presumptions 
would make arousal in such contexts seem utterly normal,” if not presumably the normalcy 
of an objectifying masculine gaze (Butler, 92). 
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(more broadly), his lack of engagement with the other types of embodiment 
does not preclude his thought from offering us valuable resources and read-
ings for articulating non-normative gender and sexual identities. Salamon 
contends that Merleau-Ponty’s masculine perspective does not constitute an 
exclusive commitment to a singular “normal,” but rather that he displays an 
ignorance to other types of embodiment. His writings do not preclude the 
inclusion of alternative or non-normative styles of embodiment; he simply 
remains unaware of their qualitatively different perspectives. She outlines 
her project as one that, even despite the normative presumptions evident 
in Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology, nonetheless embraces the conceptual 
resources, insights, and possibilities latent within his project. For Salamon, 
“even given the dearth of attention to non-normative genders in this text, 
the phenomenological approach to the body that Merleau-Ponty offers…
can be uniquely useful for understanding trans embodiment.”16 Salamon 
undertakes a similar approach in her assessment of Merleau-Ponty’s work 
along the lines of disability studies and crippled embodiment (as we shall 
later consider), showing a predilection for constructive emendation and 
revision, rather than leveling destructive critique and dispensing with his 
phenomenological framework entirely. Indeed, Salamon seeks out the ave-
nues through which his work can be expanded without contradicting his 
project as a whole. She notes:
Perhaps the most vital aspect of phenomenology is its insistence that the 
body is crucial for understanding subjectivity, rather than incidental to or 
a distraction from it. And one of the most important aspects of the body is 
its manifestation and apprehension of sexuality. Though Merleau-Ponty 
has been criticized for his masculinist approach, his insistence that sex-
uality is vital for understanding both the human body and subjectivity 
offers at least the promise of new ways of conceptualizing each that would seem 
to be aligned with feminism and trans studies.17 
Salamon highlights the value of Merleau-Ponty’s insight into the link 
between sexuality as an affective and expressive dimension to corporeal 
human existence. She affirms the continued centrality of the body and goes 
on to embrace the essentially “ambiguous” nature of sexuality – something 
that can further assist in articulating non-normative gender identities and 
sexualities as a “more purposeful confounding” of rigid categories of sexual 
difference.18 
Merleau-Ponty’s account of sexuality – while construed primarily accord-
ing to the masculinist, objectifying gaze that Butler critiques – nonetheless 
includes a valuable insight and potential means of articulating the phe-
nomenological reality of trans embodiment and queer sexuality. He also 
16  Salamon, Assuming a Body, 44
17  Ibid., 44. Emphasis added
18  Idem.
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underscores its overall centrality to the body as the affective dimension and 
expressive power which permeates and diffuses throughout my embodied 
existence. He observes, “sexuality can motivate privileged forms of my 
experience without being the object of an explicit act of consciousness. Thus 
understood as an ambiguous atmosphere, sexuality is coextensive with 
life.”19 This all-pervasive yet non-schematizable nature of sexuality reveals 
its essential coextensiveness with my embodied being yet in an ambiguous 
and indeterminate way – providing an avenue through which to critique 
and to question the presumption of rigidly fixed, purely heteronormative 
accounts of gender and sexuality. Salamon’s work thus sees resources and 
potential value to Merleau-Ponty’s nonetheless normative and masculinist 
approach – salvaging it for emendation and expansion without dispensing 
with or rejecting his work entirely. 
Beyond critiques offered by feminist, gender, and sexuality studies, 
Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology proves insufficient across racial differ-
ences, as well – a claim made clear in the rise of post-colonial critiques 
and philosophies of race. A truly exhaustive accounting of such critiques 
exceed the size and scope of this paper, although they are worth noting as 
prominent other strands of critique in amending or criticizing the normative 
account of embodiment put forward by the Phenomenology of Perception. 
Frantz Fanon notably supplements Merleau-Ponty’s perspective along 
the lines of race in his Black Skin, White Masks, noting the insufficiency of 
Merleau-Ponty’s all-encompassing account of embodiment to account for 
the clear difference in experience of an oppressed race in a racially-charged 
and oppressive milieu.20 
Fanon argues for the insufficiency of an all-inclusive, overarching account of 
embodiment – one that does not provide room for different types or modes 
of embodiment and so it consequently whitewashes any racial differences 
19  Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, 172. 
20  See Frantz Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks (New York: Grove Press, 2008). For critical 
appropriations of Fanon’s thought with respect to Merleau-Ponty and modes of embodi-
ment, see Cynthia R. Nielsen, “Resistance through re-narration: Fanon on de-constructing 
radicalized subjectivities,” in African Identities, Vol.9, No.4 (November 2011), 363-85. Nielsen 
observes that, “although appreciative of Merleau-Ponty’s emphasis on our embodied being-
in-the-world, [Fanon] is ultimately unsatisfied with what he takes as the latter’s overly 
generic schema and thus introduces his notion of an historico-racial schema as that which 
is imposed by the white other. For Fanon, Merleau-Ponty’s inclusive, universal rendering 
of the corporeal schema does not account for the disparity of experience between white and 
blacks in a colonized and racially oppressive context” (367). Kristin Zeiler similarly situates 
Fanon as a helpful amendment to Merleau-Ponty’s thought, noting that despite its normative 
perspective, Fanon nonetheless “situates himself in a phenomenological tradition and shows 
how insufficient it is to examine the role of the body for human meaning-making without 
also examining how particular bodily features such as one’s skin-color can open the world 
in different ways in different contexts.” See Zeiler, K., “A Phenomenology of Excorporation, 
Bodily Alienation, and Resistance: Rethinking Sexed and Racialized Embodiment,” in Hypatia 
vol.28, no.1 (Winter 2013), 76.
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to perspective and the felt sense of the body, its capacities, and its situation. 
And yet, rather than dismissing the overall project of Merleau-Ponty’s 
phenomenology, he seeks to work from within the tradition and expand 
its frame of reference – amending Merleau-Ponty’s account with a means 
to consider another means of embodiment. 
Despite the wide-ranging and highly critical nature of the above cri-
tiques, I do not believe that Merleau-Ponty’s failure to account for these 
alternative modes of embodiment necessitates a dismissal of his phenom-
enological project as such. His ignorance of non-normative perspectives 
of embodiment in the Phenomenology of Perception does not preclude their 
inclusion into the framework provided by his philosophy (as, for example, 
Fanon demonstrates and Salamon advocates). Nothing that Merleau-Ponty 
says explicitly forbids these non-normative modes of embodiment from 
phenomenological assessment on their own terms, and critical engage-
ment with his thought enables us to fill in the lacunae left by his ignorance 
on these points – to flesh out his philosophy further and to give it a new 
dimension of appropriation and extension.
III. A More Radical Critique of Normativity:  
Reclaiming Alternative Embodiment  
through the Disabled Body
While post-colonial racial critiques, non-normative gender identities, 
queer theory, sexuality studies, and feminist perspectives all stand to offer 
valuable amendments and expansions to Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology, 
I find that accounts of normative embodiment can and must be challenged 
on a more primordial, originary level – that of physical disability and hand-
icap of the embodied self. 
I contend that the alternative perspectives provided by disabled embodi-
ment lived differently stand to provide an invaluable corrective to Merleau-
Ponty’s otherwise normative account. I also claim that physical disability 
stands as the grounding and paradigmatic example of non-normativity 
– what I consider to be a “limit case” of non-normative embodiment at its 
most radical mode of incarnation. Through disability studies, we stand 
capable of articulating a genuinely alternative mode of embodiment that 
will overcome Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological normativity and open 
the door for the existence of multiple “modes” or “kinds” of embodiment. 
In doing so, I believe that we can similarly articulate other phenomenolog-
ically valid modes of embodiment without recourse to a normal. 
Before progressing to consider narratives of disabled embodiment, I 
pause briefly to justify such a method. Above I make the rather startling 
claim that physical disability and handicap represent privileged cases 
and extreme examples that constitute a limit situation of non-normative 
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embodiment (more so than even race, gender, and sexuality). One may 
easily object that, aside from being yet another example of non-normative 
embodiment, how does physical handicap relate in any way to differences 
in gender, race, and sexuality – and how can we claim it to be a privileged 
case of non-normativity? I contend that physical disability offers us such a 
privilege way of articulating non-normative types of embodiment in two 
primary ways:
First and foremost, physical disability historically has been – and remains 
– the primary means of expressing any notion of “defective” or “deficient” 
embodiment against the norm (so much to the point that it has previously 
served as the overall category by which to construe the feminine, the queer, 
and the black).21 While in the biological and medical community almost no 
one would currently argue that women, divergent sexual orientations, and 
non-white races constitute a “defect” or disability of the human body, such 
arguments have prevailed as medical consensus and were advocated by 
some of philosophy’s greatest figures. In both the history of philosophy, 
theological discourse, and medical/biological explanations, the existence of 
different races, the female sex, and “deviant” sexual orientations/identities 
have been classified as forms of disability or handicap – a biological deficit 
when measured against the norm, made manifest in an uncontrollable and 
unwilled (yet unchangeable) mode of embodiment.22 Contemporary con-
struals of physical disability and handicap, however, continue to be viewed 
in such terms – considered merely as disfiguration and deficit, and on a 
physical level this labeling continues to imply a deeper sense of biological, 
essential deficiency in its very nature. Even other non-normative embodied 
critiques, such as Iris Marion Young’s account as noted above, employ the 
incredibly broad and polemically charged term of “physical handicap” to 
describe the situation of women who experience their non-normative mode 
of embodiment as a burden, a pain, or limitation.23 Far from a mere rhetor-
21  Again, one could similarly construe varying types of critiques – along the lines of 
class, socio-economic standing, religion, language, etc. – as those against which we should 
similarly challenge a normative perspective. My concern here, however, applies solely to 
those modes of embodiment for whom their very incarnate mode of existence, their body, 
becomes the site of such disruption, violence, and relegation as “defective.”
22  Notably, Aristotle, Galen, and Soranus considered women in such terms, noting 
them to be “defective” and “incomplete” men by virtue of inadequate heat during the 
gestational period. See Aristotle’s Generation of Animals 2.2-5, 4.1-3 and Soranus’ Gynecology 
3.1-6. Similarly, philosophical treatments of non-normative sexualities labeled them as 
“intrinsically disordered” and “unnatural” in both Thomistic and natural law perspectives. 
Such arguments continue to hold sway in many theological articulations of human sexuality. 
Medically, such a position prevailed until 1974 when homosexuality remained a psychiat-
ric disability in the American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of 
Mental Disorders, 2nd edition (DSM-II). Similar means of labeling the racially different (spe-
cifically black individuals) as inferior or sub-human drove many of the pro-slavery positions 
throughout the Enlightenment and post-colonial period, even through the civil rights era. 
23  Young, “Throwing Like a Girl,” 42-3. Also see above, Section II, page 8.  
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ical device, physical handicap has served – and continues to function – as 
an overarching category and paradigmatic example of defect, deficit, and 
non-normativity. Attacking the last truly acceptable mode of “defective” 
embodiment would definitively liberate our phenomenological lenses from 
the normativity implied by the able-bodied. Further, once opening the path 
for genuinely alternative modes of embodiment at such a radical level, the 
possibility for the existence of multiple modes of non-normative embodi-
ment in other ways similarly unfolds. 
The second, and more methodological reason for adopting disability 
studies as a privileged mode of critiquing Merleau-Ponty, stems from the 
nature of his own case studies in the Phenomenology of Perception. Unlike 
questions of race, gender, and sexuality, Merleau-Ponty himself recognizes 
disability and the pathological in his own writings and engages explicitly 
with them. As such, they provide not only a means of critiquing Merleau-
Ponty’s account of normativity, but a direct avenue of entry into his thought 
itself for expansion and amendment from within.
Claiming the realm of physical handicap and disability as a privileged 
means of encountering non-normative modes of embodiment from within 
Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology itself, I turn to yet another constructive 
and nuanced account offered by Gayle Salamon vis-à-vis disabled embod-
iment. Salamon engages with Merleau-Ponty and more normative read-
ings of his work on this front – further challenging normative accounts of 
embodiment through the perspective of two very different, extreme cases 
of physical disability.24 Against his more normative perspectives, she posits 
narratives drawn from the embodied experience of two disabled women 
– one who acquires the disabling condition of Rheumatoid Arthritis (RA), 
the other crippled from birth with a progressive muscular degenerative 
disease. Salamon ultimately demonstrates how their narratives provide 
alternative accounts of living their embodiment differently – an alternative 
yet equally valid mode of embodiment. Salamon sets her discussion up not 
only against Merleau-Ponty’s account of normativity, but interpretations of 
his thought that continue to presume a patriarchal and normative reading 
of embodiment (such as that set forward by Hubert Dreyfus, arguing for 
a strong, able-bodied, “patriarchal” subject poised to “grip” and control 
the world).25 Salamon proceeds to challenge both Merleau-Ponty and his 
24  Gayle Salamon, “The Phenomenology of Rheumatology: Disability, Merleau-Ponty, 
and the Fallacy of Maximal Grip,” in Hypatia (27/2), pp.245-6.
25  It is worth noting at the outset of this conversation that Dreyfus’ article, “Intelligence 
without representation – Merleau-Ponty’s critique of mental representation,” in Phenomenology 
and the Cognitive Sciences (2002), deals primarily with epistemological implications of Merleau-
Ponty’s notions of maximal grip and the intentional arc. He situates these in the situation of 
skills known and acquired through instruction – as well as the ability to “know” such skills 
without objective representation. Nonetheless, he does assert that such motifs of absolute 
“control of my movements” and causation of said movements by the “gestalt formed by me 
and my situation” are the hallmarks of all intelligent human agents (380). 
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normative interpreters through the “disabled particularity” of an embodied 
life “lived differently.”26
Salamon initially seems to set up Mary Felstiner’s narrative of disabling 
Rheumatoid Arthritis and Harriet McBryde Johnson’s account of crippled 
embodiment in contrast to Merleau-Ponty’s normative phenomenological 
perspective. Felstiner’s embodiment is characterized by pain and limitation, 
“a kind of dispossession, a loss of that proprioceptive privilege enjoyed or 
merely taken for granted by those who are not ill or infirm,” seemingly 
divorced from the “normal” perspective taken for granted by Merleau-
Ponty in the Phenomenology of Perception.27 Yet as Salamon progresses in her 
assessment, she identifies not Merleau-Ponty’s account per se as problematic, 
but rather appropriations of his thought that characterize his “philosophy 
of embodiment as one of maximal grip,” a metaphor that proves inept and 
ill-suited when faced with the account of RA and disability.28 The meta-
phoric use of grip as an expression of our “enmeshment” with the world, 
as well as its epistemological and subjective consequences, posit a strongly 
subjective, patriarchal and controlling embodied self – one which leaves 
no room for the comparatively weak, defective, and limited disabled body 
(a body that is “short-circuited by arthritis” and defined with respect to its 
limitations rather than its capabilities).
Much like her assessment of Merleau-Ponty vis-à-vis transgender stud-
ies, Salamon refuses to dispense with Merleau-Ponty tout court. She rather 
adopts an approach to preserve and to salvage his phenomenology, offering 
instead a friendly amendment to his thought through a more sympathetic 
reading. Consequently, Salamon rejects Dreyfus’ reading as misguided and 
unfaithful to the actual text of Merleau-Ponty. In the face of a self which 
“grips the world” and draws it closer to myself as I shape it, Salamon asserts 
that such a reading “ignores the aspects of relation and reversibility that 
are such vital components of the phenomenological world,” and her return 
to Merleau-Ponty’s accounts through the eyes of disabled embodiment 
conveys this quite strongly.29 For both Salamon and Merleau-Ponty, I am 
not the sole agent who “grips” the world – but rather in my enmeshment 
with the world, the world ‘grips me’ in my embodied situation. She cites 
examples from Merleau-Ponty about being ‘invaded’ by a word and feel-
ing it in the body, or of the patient Schneider needing to ‘take a grip’ in 
the face of a future unknown, in order to undermine the sense that “max-
imal grip” equates with epistemic and subjective mastery of a situation. 
Salamon ultimately ties this reading of Merleau-Ponty back to the situation 
of Felstiner suffering from RA, one who can no longer “grip” the world and 
yet is constantly gripped by her embodied situation of pain and limitation 
26  Salamon, “Phenomenology of Rheumatology,” 250.
27  Ibid., 244. 
28  Ibid., 245. 
29  Ibid., 244. 
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within the world. This reading thus reverses Dreyfus’ account of grip as 
control – instead viewing grip as a response to the impending lack of control 
vis-à-vis the world. 
Salamon examines “grip” through the lens of disabled bodies as that 
which fundamentally changes the subject’s interaction with the world. She 
reads the idea of maximal grip as both a bodily action “and a description of 
a style of being in the world,” and that such a life is “lived differently.”30 In 
this way, she reclaims Merleau-Ponty as a potential resource for disability 
studies against more normative interpretations promoted by Dreyfus. Her 
reading salvages Merleau-Ponty’s text from a normative interpretation of 
embodied being along the lines of patriarchy, epistemological mastery, and 
a unidirectional subjectivity by reasserting the “reversibility” of the world’s 
grip and the experience of disabled/crippled women. Thus a space emerges 
through which alternative accounts of embodiment and the experience of 
living differently (even in pain, limitation, and reliance upon others) can be 
phenomenologically described – not purely one characterized by powers, 
capacities, and potential.
Although Merleau-Ponty employs disabled or pathological examples 
throughout the phenomenology of perception, he nonetheless fails to offer 
a robust phenomenological account of disabled embodied existence on its 
own terms.31 Disabled embodiment occupies a curious position in Merleau-
Ponty’s thought for, unlike the seeming ignorance of non-normative modes 
of embodiment along the lines of race, gender, and sexuality, Merleau-Ponty 
explicitly engages with examples of disabled individuals, the physically 
handicapped, and pathological patients. Their example holds open a win-
dow within the Phenomenology of Perception itself for articulating a genuinely 
alternative mode of embodiment that need not stand in relation to the norm 
as simply “defective,” “pathological,” or “deficient.”
In the wake of Salamon’s reading, if Dreyfus’ interpretation of maximal 
grip is no longer the defining characteristic of embodiment, disabled embodi-
ment can stand as a valid form or type of embodiment in itself. It can emerge 
as its own kind of embodiment, open to assessment and consideration on 
its own terms, rather than simply as a marred subset of a singular type of 
embodiment that is able-bodied, healthy, and normative. 
Merleau-Ponty himself even seems to recognize this at several points 
throughout the Phenomenology of Perception, although he fails to pursue it 
further and articulate non-normative embodiment on its own terms. Even 
when he employs examples from the experiences of a child or a patient, he 
refuses to subsume them under a singular, overarching mode of embodi-
ment characterized as “the normal,” to which these experiences would then 
30  Ibid., 247. 
31  See Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, 144-5 for his discussion of a blind 
man using a cane in order to demonstrate the essential malleability and expansive powers 
of the body schema. His recourse to the case of Schneider throughout the work is evident. 
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relate in a somehow deficient way. Faced with the apparent deficits of the 
patient or the child in relation to a healthy adult, he observes, “it cannot be 
a question of simply transferring to the normal person what is missing in 
the patient and what he is trying to recover. Illness, like childhood or like 
the ‘primitive’ state, is a complete form of existence….”32 The normal does 
not stand as the sole, complete and perfect mode of embodiment to which 
everything else must somehow relate or from which they derive, but rather 
we must treat these variants “as modalities and variations of the subject’s 
total being.”33 These alternative modes of embodiment (be it childhood, the 
pathological, or disability) are, in themselves, complete and total modes of 
being on their own terms that cannot be schematized merely in relation to 
a singular “normal” as deficits or defects. 
Merleau-Ponty similarly contends elsewhere that we cannot employ 
the “normal” to measure the perceptions and experiences of the child or 
the patient as a lower state of a more proper, normal perspective. With 
respect to the perception and experience of colors, a real change in the 
structure of consciousness must be accounted for instead of attempting 
to situate these experiences along a spectrum experienced by the healthy 
adult. Merleau-Ponty notes this in his criticism of psychologism, writing, 
“We cannot compare these phenomena occupying the place of color for the 
child to any determinate quality, and likewise the patient’s ‘strange’ colors 
cannot be identified with any colors of the spectrum. The first perception 
of colors, properly so called, is thus a change in the structure of conscious-
ness, the institution of a new dimension of experience….”34 Merleau-Ponty 
recognizes that these experiences and perceptions differ in a more radical, 
qualitative way than simply being a lower gradation on a spectrum (in 
which the healthy adult represents the highest, most perfect, and normative 
form against which all others are measured). Merleau-Ponty thus seems 
to recognize these alternative types of embodiment which open onto their 
own uniquely-conditioned worlds. 
Similarly, disabled embodiment does not stand as a lower rung on the 
ladder of normalcy defined by the healthy adult body. If, as Merleau-Ponty 
claims, the body truly stands “as the mediator of a world,” by which the 
individual “is his [sic] body and his body is the power for a certain world,” 
then these alternative types of embodiment open onto their own experiences 
of the world in an alternative livability – not merely a defective or deficient 
one.35 Rather than stripping the disabled (or the child, or the patient) of a 
world, we can posit an alternative type of world in which they inhabit. 
Returning to Felstiner’s narrative, Salamon notes that, if we adopt a nor-
mative reading, “Felstiner should be utterly de-worlded by this loss of her 
32  Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, 110. 
33  Idem. 
34  Ibid., 32. 
35  Ibid., 109, 146.  
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hands…without the capacity for maximal grip, does she then have no world 
at all?”36 Such a fate would also befall Johnson, not having the use of her 
legs and thus relegated to a position of immobility. Yet Merleau-Ponty’s 
account of even the pathological and the childlike does not allow for such 
a “de-worlding” of these alternative embodiments – they rather emerge as 
their own forms of “total being,” an embodiment lived differently which 
opens onto a world of alternative livability.
Even in asserting disabled embodiment as an alternative phenomenolog-
ical perspective, Salamon argues with a great deal of nuance by presenting 
two accounts of disability in dialogue with normalcy as well as with each 
other. Johnson’s experience cannot merely be equated with Felstiner’s as 
simply “disabled,” for clear differences persist which prevent our glossing 
over any particularities in their accounts. She contrasts Felstiner’s account 
of an acquired RA disability with Johnson’s radically different narrative 
(crippled from birth by a progressive degenerative illness) to demonstrate 
that a phenomenology of disabled embodiment need not imply a homog-
enization of differences.37 Cautious against slipping into a universalizing 
or normative account, she posits a phenomenological category without 
homogenizing the variety it contains.
Similarly, other critics recognize the inability to universalize and homog-
enize other “non-normative” perspectives while nonetheless offering a 
useful (and valid) phenomenological category to describe real experiences. 
Returning to Iris Marion Young’s feminist critiques, she recognizes that any 
perspective of a non-normative body can only assert itself as a “mode” of 
embodiment if it simultaneously recognizes that it cannot simply “become” 
a new norm. A level of variability and difference must continue to exist, and 
yet the category nonetheless proves useful in articulating some similarity 
without homogenizing all individuality and the particular nature of one’s 
experience. Young, recognizing this paradoxical limitation, notes:
I speak from my own experience, which…is particular and limited, and 
it is possible that it most resonate among white, middle-class, heterosex-
ual professional women in late capitalist society. I believe that some of 
the experience I express resonates with that of other women, but that is 
for them to say. The differences among women do not circumscribe us within 
exclusive categories, but the only way we can know our similarities and differ-
ences is by each of us expressing our particular experience.38
Young articulates the reality of a larger phenomenological category that 
nonetheless must (and does) preserve heterogeneity within the group. 
While very real differences in situation, embodiment and experience do 
36  Salamon, “Phenomenology of Rheumatology,” 246. 
37  Ibid., 254. 
38  See Iris Marion Young, “Women Recovering Our Clothes,” in On Female Body Experience: 
“Throwing Like a Girl” and Other Essays (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 69. 
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exist, they do not lapse into entirely relativistic and independent perspec-
tives by virtue of being “outside” the norm. Clear similarities exist even in 
the face of such differences – the reality of which enables an overarching 
phenomenological category to apply without effacing individuality and 
uniqueness of situation. Or, as Young observes elsewhere, “The situation 
of women within a given socio-historical set of circumstances, despite the 
individual variation in each woman’s experience, opportunities, and pos-
sibilities, has a unity which can be described and made intelligible.”39 This unity 
enables a real and valid phenomenological category to apply without super-
ficially glossing over differences. 
In a similar way for Salamon, bringing Felstiner and Johnson as counter-
examples to Dreyfus’ reading show that disabled embodiment may exist as 
an alternative type of embodiment, and yet by highlighting the differences 
between Felstiner and Johnson she equally prevents us from superficially 
labeling all disabled embodiment as a singular, uniform experience in 
itself.40 The variability within the category allows for different phenomeno-
logical perspectives and experiences, though the larger category as a type 
of embodiment enables us to consider central aspects that are shared by its 
particular incarnations. We thus avoid an unwarranted whitewashing of 
all individuality and variants within a category (or setting it up as a nor-
mative paradigm against which the individuals will be measured) without 
simultaneously slipping into an entirely individualized, relativistic view 
of embodiment.
By viewing disabled individuals as embodied human subjectivity lived 
differently rather than deficiently, we gain the ability to consider the possibility 
for “types” or “kinds” of embodiment in a separate (yet equally valid) phe-
nomenological category. This consequently opens a space through which 
to articulate new perspectives on different embodiment without homoge-
nizing individuals and indiscriminately lumping them all together, but 
also without ignoring similarities that distinguish larger classes, types, or 
modes of embodiment.
When pressed to its most radical reading, the accounts of disabled 
embodiment undermine the notion of normative human embodiment 
at its root – glimpsing the possibility for distinct “types” or “kinds” of 
39  Young, “Throwing Like a Girl,” 29.  
40  The divergent experiences of the two women are striking, as Salamon observes. Despite 
the seemingly shared experience of ‘disabled embodiment,’ they encounter and view the 
world in opposite terms. Felstiner defines her bodily enmeshment in the world according 
to its limitations vis-à-vis her disability, while Johnson views her body as a horizon of capa-
bility. They even view their relationship with their own bodies in different ways. Salamon 
contrasts the two, noting, “Johnson insists that she is not separable from her body, that she 
is her body. The different is that for Felstiner, this condition of being her body replaces a 
previous condition of having had the luxury of ignoring it, the privilege of the normate 
body. For Felstiner, that body both is her life and is a hindrance to it. By contrast, Johnson’s 
body and her life have never been separable” (259).
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embodiment that are not simply subsets of what one considers the nor-
mative perspective. Indeed, differing kinds of embodiment seem possible 
in the wake of such a critique – types of embodiment that can similarly be 
employed constructively to consider non-normative gender, sexuality and 
race. Through the perspective of disability studies and other incarnations 
of non-normative embodiment, Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy lends itself 
to such a constructive intervention. Valid and fruitful phenomenological 
categories thus emerge to challenge the monopolizing, totalizing scope of 
the phantasmal “normal,” enabling us to articulate the embodied experi-
ences of these alternative modes on their own terms – and thereby offering 
a more authentic means of articulating the lived experience of embodied 
human subjectivities. 
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